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J. Philip Wogaman, 1986, Economics and Ethics: A
Christian Inquiry (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986),
Ch. 1.
e.

Justice in other religions.
Seymour Siegel. “A Jewish View of Economic Justice,”
in Contemporary Jewish Ethics and Morality, E.N. Dorff
& L.E. Newman, eds. (Oxford University Press, 1995)
pp. 336-43.

Schedule
Sept 2: Introduction and overview.
Sept 7: W. Ver Eecke, “Authority in economics”
Sept 9: Economic Justice for All.
Sept 14: W. Ver Eecke, “The Economic Order: A Human, Not a
Natural Institution”
Sept 16: Bator, Francis M., “The Simple Analytics of Welfare
Maximization”
Sept 21: Wildavsky, Aaron, “Why the Traditional Distinction
between Public and Private Goods Should Be
Abandoned”
Sept 23: W. Ver Eecke, “Objecting to a Libertarian Attack”
Sept 28: Musgrave’s introduction of the concept merit good
Sept 30: Musgrave’s many definitions and justifications
Oct 5: Musgrave’s many definitions and justifications
Oct 7: McLure, “Merit Wants: A Normatively Empty Box”
Mackscheidt, Klaus. “Meritorische Güter: Musgraves Idee
und Deren Konsequenzen.” (Translated)
Oct 12: Folkers, Cay, “Meritorische Güter Als Problem der
Normativen Theorie Öffentliche Ausgaben.” (Translated)
Oct 14: Brennan, Geoffrey, and Loren Lomasky, “Institutional
Aspects of ‘Merit Goods’ Analysis”
Oct 19: Burrows, “Efficient Pricing and Government
Interference”
Oct 21: Ver Eecke, “Concept of Merit Good”
Oct 26: Rawls, John, “Justice as Fairness”
Oct 28: Baier., A., “The Need for more than Justice”
Nov 2: Sen, A.K., “More Than 100 Million Women are Missing”
Nov 4: Sen, A.K., “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory”
Nov 9: Ver Eecke, W., “Ethical Function of the Economy” (on
Hegel)
Nov 11: Buchanan, James, “Fairness, Hope and Justice”
Nov 16: Stiglitz, “Whither Reform?”
Nov 18: Briefs, “The Ethos Problem in the Present Pluralistic
Society”
Nov 23: Summary of: Olson, M., “The Political Economy of
Comparative Growth”
Glendon, M.A ., “Rights in the Twentieth-Centur y
Constitutions.”
Discussion of: Ver Eecke. “Unjust redistribution in the
American system”
Nov 30: John Paul II, Centesimus Annus
Dec 2: W. Ver Eecke, “Structural Deficiencies in the American
System”
Dec 7: Wogaman, Economics and Ethics: A Christian Inquiry
Siegel, Seymour, “A Jewish View of Economic Justice”

Mechanics of the course:
1. The course will be conducted as a seminar. Sometimes
I will summarize the content of the readings. Sometimes
questions will be distributed to be discussed in groups and to

be reported back to the class. Most of the time, a student will be
assigned to present the reading material. At all times the whole
class is expected to be prepared for discussing the material,
unless an explicit exception is made. Questions dealing with
problems of understanding the material will be dealt with first.
Afterwards questions about the validity of the arguments will
be addressed.
2. After each section, all students are expected to show their
understanding of the material by writing a 4 page (double
spaced) paper answering one or more questions about that
section. The paper is to be handed in one week after the end
of the section. A rewrite is possible for the first paper. For all
students, one paper may be replaced by a summary of a topic
related to the chapter but not covered in class, e.g., ideas
from the recommended reading. Such an option needs to be
approved by the teacher.
Graduate or professional students need to present at the
end of the course a final paper of 10-15 pages. You may relate
some topics covered in the course to your own research area or
you may summarize ideas of important authors and relate them
to topics treated in the course (Brennan, Rawls, Buchanan,
Sen, de Soto, Krugman, Stiglitz) or you may address important
issues such as globalization, poverty, the role of international
institutions, wealth distribution making use of the ideas
discussed in the class. You need to have approval for the topic
of your research paper.
For graduate and professional students, the research paper
counts for half of the points determining the grade.
3. Class participation and class presentation may count
towards the grade. Class absence for a valid reason needs to
be explained to the professor.
4. No final exam.

Real Philosophy, Good Teaching and Academic
Freedom
Lou Matz

University of the Pacific
In its “Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of
Philosophy,” the APA exhorts philosophers, philosophy
departments, and their institutions to be committed to providing
“educational experiences of high quality.”1 To this end, the
APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy shares pedagogical
best practices, giving faculty and departments new ideas and
approaches to teaching philosophy more effectively and to
improving philosophy curricula. In certain circumstances, it is
not enough, however, to use effective teaching methods; one
must persuade one’s colleagues and institution that one is, in
fact, delivering a quality educational experience. Since teaching
skill is determined by others—especially by one’s colleagues
who are typically the final authorities—how well one teaches is
ultimately dependent on the fairness and competence of one’s
departmental colleagues. If one’s colleagues apply unfair or
illegitimate standards to judge the quality of instruction, one’s
teaching skill might not only be misrepresented but one’s
academic freedom might also be violated. I contend that this
is what happened to me when I applied for tenure at Xavier
University, and I recommend that the APA add a section on
academic freedom to its “Statements on the Profession: The
Teaching of Philosophy” to guide departments more clearly and
to support those faculty whose pedagogical views might be at
odds with those of their department.
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In 1992, I began a tenure-track position at Xavier University,
a Jesuit-Catholic institution in Cincinnati, Ohio. I appeared
to be a good fit for the department since its orientation was
primarily historical. My graduate training at the University of
California–San Diego was steeped in the history of philosophy
and focused primarily on Hegel, Kant, and Plato. I wrote a
dissertation on the relationship between freedom and character
in Plato’s Republic and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. For five years
of my graduate study, I was a teaching assistant in a five-quarter
“Great Books” writing program.
Xavier’s department of philosophy is an undergraduate
program whose primary function is to serve general education
since all students must take three philosophy courses in this
order: Ethics as Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 100), Theory
of Knowledge, and an upper-level elective of the student’s
choice. My teaching load was three courses per semester, and
in each semester for seven years, I taught two sections of PHIL
100, which is the first philosophy course that students take and
which is taken during their first-year, usually in the first semester.
In the university catalogs from 1992-1996, the description of
PHIL 100 was the following:
“The goals of human life; the first principle of morality;
virtue, duty, law, responsibility. Special emphasis on
justice.”
In its 1994 program review, the department summarized its
description of PHIL 100 as follows:
“In order to insure a common philosophical culture
for advanced study at the elective level, each section
of the Ethics as Introduction to Philosophy course
requires the student to read the Republic of Plato and
to engage the question of justice.”
Finally, there was an addition to the course description in the
1996 university catalog, a year before I applied for tenure.
“The goals of human life; the first principle of morality;
virtue, duty, law, responsibility. Special emphasis
on justice, along with a treatment of Deontological,
Utilitarian and Natural Law/Right theories that are
central to contemporary treatments of practical and
professional ethics.”
PHIL 100 was also part of a sub-core curriculum—titled
the “Ethics, Religion, and Society” program (E/RS)—whose
purpose was to devote “special attention to ethical issues of
social significance” (1996-98 Catalog). The premise of the
E/RS program is to teach students how different disciplines—
philosophy, theology, and literature—examine ethical issues
that are relevant today.
Within the framework of the course description for PHIL
100, faculty were required only to teach Plato’s Republic;
otherwise, it was their discretion to teach whatever primary
source material that engaged the subject matter of the course.
There was neither a requirement—stated or unstated—to
teach any text other than the Republic nor a ranking of what
course themes were the most important to teach, and faculty
approached the course in a wide variety of ways.
In my fourteen semesters of teaching PHIL 100, I regularly
varied the readings and issues in the course. Table 1 states
by semester the works and the order in which I taught them.
In my first semester of teaching PHIL 100, I approached
the course in a traditional way by teaching standard ethical
works chronologically: Plato’s Republic, Hume’s An Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals, Kant’s Groundwork of
the Metaphysic of Morals, and Mill’s Utilitarianism and On
Liberty. I assumed that students would have to struggle with

the readings, and I also worried that they might have difficulty
appreciating the importance and contemporary relevance of
these ethical works. To make the material of the course more
accessible and engaging for first-year students—virtually all of
whom would not major in philosophy and who would likely not
take any other ethics courses in philosophy—I decided to take
a different approach. I began the next semester’s course with
Camus’ The Plague, a novel that depicts through its characters
different philosophical and ethical responses to human
suffering. I then followed The Plague with Mill’s On Liberty
and Subjection of Women. I dropped Utilitarianism altogether
(though I reinserted it into my course a few years later) and I
made On Liberty (along with the Republic) a permanent feature
of my course for the following reasons: In On Liberty Mill states
his utilitarian standard and applies it to a variety of significant
issues of justice; On Liberty is a more complete statement of
Mill’s ethical thought since it includes the harm principle, which
complicates his version of utilitarianism; On Liberty includes
Mill’s most sustained discussion of the virtues; and Mill’s defense
of liberalism in On Liberty makes for a philosophically richer
comparison to Plato’s Republic than Utilitarianism, especially
given Plato’s famous critique of liberty and equality in Book
VIII. The Subjection of Women further illustrated the application
of Mill’s utilitarian principles to issues of sexual equality and
provided an opportunity to discuss the appeal to “nature” or
“natural” as a standard of morality, which Mill addresses and
rejects in the work. During this phase of my teaching of the
course (spring 1993 to spring 1995), I included Dostoyevsky’s
“The Grand Inquisitor” as a challenge to Mill’s assumptions
about the value of individual liberty.
In the next phase of my teaching of the course (fall 1995 to
fall 1996), I dropped The Plague and The Subjection of Women
and began the course with Plato’s Apology and Crito and then
had students read Locke’s Second Treatise and Thoreau’s “Civil
Disobedience” in order to offer students a later version of the
treatment of some issues covered in the Crito. For example, I
wanted students to see how the arguments presented by the
Athenian Laws in the Crito reappear in Locke yet are developed
further; how Locke’s notion of a natural moral law, though absent
in the Crito, has its roots in Plato’s ergon argument in Book I of
the Republic; and how morality is related to politics and law since
in civil societies legal and political authorities are necessary to
interpret and resolve disputes about moral issues that arise in
many social contexts. The fourth phase of my teaching of this
course (fall 1996-spring 1998) was similar to the third one except
that I followed Mill’s On Liberty with chapters from Singer’s
Practical Ethics on equality for animals, abortion, and euthanasia
to extend our examination of issues of justice.
One of my regular pedagogical strategies in PHIL 100
during all of these phases was occasionally to connect the ideas
and issues in the readings to contemporary events through
newspaper articles in order to show the relevance of philosophy
today and to illustrate the abstract principles of the readings
with contemporary examples. For the students, the articles
were useful supplements to the philosophical readings, and
for me the search for articles led me to rethink the ideas in the
readings in new ways.
My assignments in PHIL 100 varied but usually consisted
of two papers and two exams; or two papers, an examination,
and regular quizzes. The papers were always thesis-based and
required demonstration of an understanding of the relevant
ideas in the primary source readings and a critical assessment of
these ideas to demonstrate a capacity for independent analysis.
The exams consisted of short-answer essay questions, often
comparative. Whenever I used quizzes, they constituted no
more than 25 percent of the course grade and were primarily
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used to motivate students to read carefully in order to improve
However, this senior member’s own report of my teaching
the quality of class discussion and to hold them accountable
was predominant in the department’s evaluation for he stated
for the readings. In honors sections or in special first-year
in his report that most of my PHIL 100 course was “not about
seminar sections of the course, I also assigned the students class
principles of ethics, but about what we would at best call
presentations and would meet with each student out of class
politics, such as civil disobedience, liberty, women’s rights,
in preparation for them since the material was often difficult
animal rights, etc.,” and he objected to what he believed was
for students on their own.
my study of “easy issues discussed regularly in the media
instead of addressing the fundamental questions, even though
My colleagues in the department had various other
they are difficult. So the type of material chosen and the level
approaches to PHIL 100. For many years, the most senior
of difficulty go hand in hand.”
member of the department taught only Plato’s The Trial and
Death of Socrates, the Republic, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean
As a matter of procedure, faculty in the philosophy
Ethics; later, he added Aquinas and Hobbes. Another colleague
department were not able to review the department’s (or
regularly taught the Republic, Hobbes’ Leviathan, the
chair’s) tenure evaluation, so I did not learn about its assessment
Declaration of Independence, and selections from Madison in
of my PHIL 100 course until I appealed my negative tenure
The Federalist Papers. Another colleague—my first department
decision. In fact, the only way I obtained the department’s
chair for three years—often taught only the Republic and a few
tenure evaluation was to get permission from every faculty
works by Freud. Another member of the department, whom was
member to release it to me since the process at Xavier did not
hired the same year as I, often taught only Plato and Aristotle.
require its release without explicit permission of the members
Finally, there was a colleague who taught Plato, Aristotle, Hume,
of the department.2
Kant, Gilligan, and Dewey.
Since the main reason for the department’s (and chair’s)
In 1994, the department chair conducted my mid-tenure
negative tenure evaluation was its evaluation of my teaching,
review. His report was based on student course evaluations and
I decided to appeal the decision on the grounds that my
one class visit by a senior faculty member. The report stated
academic freedom had been violated both in terms of what I
that I proved “to be an excellent classroom teacher” and that
taught and how I taught it. At Xavier, tenure appeals are only
students were “virtually universal in their high praise.” The
done in writing, and they are submitted to the same Tenure
report emphasized my effectiveness with first-year students,
and Promotion Committee that judges the case in the first
i.e., with students in my PHIL 100 course. It also stated that
place. The defense of my appeal seemed very straightforward.
there was “some concern over matters of pedagogy,” but it
Departments have a right to frame the subject matter of a course,
did not give any specifics, and there was never any follow up.
e.g., its central issues, the time period, required readings, etc.
In the summary section of my review, the only area that the
Within this framework, however, faculty should have the right
chair mentioned as an area of development was to devote less
to use their professional judgment to teach material that is
time to committee work and more focus on scholarship. Three
germane to the subject matter. Xavier presumably adhered
years later, in its 1997 tenure evaluation, the department found
to this principle of academic freedom since it included in its
“serious” problems with the quality of my PHIL 100 course. It
Faculty Handbook the classic 1940 AAUP Statement of Principles
claimed that the fundamental Table 1. Works taught by semester in my PHIL 100 course. The numbers indicate the order in which
problem was that my course I taught them.
was not really about ethics at
F92 S93 F93
S94 F94 S95
F95 S96 F96
S97 F97 S98
F98 S99
all but about “political issues,
Republic
1
5
5
3
5
6
3
3
5
8
7
6
1
1
Apology
4
1
1
1
1
1
such as the limits on the power
Crito
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
of constitutional government.”
Euthyphro
1
As a result, the department
Camus, The
1
1
1
1
5
claimed that my course was
Plague
“not intellectually stimulating,
On Liberty
5
3
2
4
3
3
5
4
7
5
5
4
because most of it deals with
Utilitarianism 4
4
6
7
4
4
political theses from Locke and
Subjection of
4
3
5
4
4
6
Mill that most Americans take
Women
for granted anyway. In effect
Locke,
3
3
3
3
Second
he is confirming the students’
Treatise
prejudices.” It also argued
Dworkin on
6
5
that the “superficial” level of
pornography
my course was evident in the
2
2
6
Dostoyevsky,
newspaper articles that I would
“Grand
hand out on contemporar y
Inquisitor”
social issues such as abortion,
Thoreau,
2
4
4
4
doctor-assisted suicide, the
Civil
Disobedience
equality of animals, and
Hume,
2
2
freedom of speech.
Enquiry
The department’s tenure
Concerning…
evaluation of my teaching was
Morals
written by the senior member
Singer,
6
6
5
5
5
of the department; he based
Practical
Ethics
this evaluation on his and his
Kant,
3
2
2
tenured colleagues’ written
Groundwork
reports of their classroom visits
3
3
Kant,
to either my PHIL 100 course or
“Doctrine of
to another one of my courses.
Virtue”
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on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which states, “teachers
are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their
subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their
teaching controversial matter that has no relation to their
subject.” In PHIL 100, faculty were required to teach only
Plato’s Republic; otherwise, they had discretion to assign any
primary source readings that dealt with the various issues of
the course, especially justice. There were no other stated or
unstated guidelines for faculty. The department never defined
what “real” ethical issues were, never required the teaching
of certain texts over others, and never required that a faculty
member examine the most prominent ethical traditions (as was
implied in the expanded 1996 course description but which was
not, in practice, followed by the department).
My defense was that I adhered to the framework of the
course and taught readings and issues that were germane to
the course description. The department thus did not have a
right to criticize what I taught since the material and issues
that I taught had “relation to their subject.” The department
thus judged my course by reference to arbitrary and unstated
standards and singled me out for teaching “political” works
despite the fact that other colleagues who taught the same
sort of material were not criticized for doing so. In introducing
the distinction it did between its own conception of how
the course issues were to be taught and my own (which it
tendentiously dubbed “political”), the department subverted
my right—and thus my academic freedom—to teach the
material in my own way. Although the department claimed
that I did not teach within the framework of the course, this
was the very point at issue: they claimed my readings and
issues were not relevant, and I claimed they were. Academic
freedom protects the right of a faculty member to disagree
with colleagues and a department so long as the former can
make a reasonable case that the readings and themes of a
course bear a direct relation to it.
As part of my written appeal, I included a letter from a
member of the philosophy department who explained the
ideological bias of the department. He pointed out that my
sympathy for “applied” ethics—evident in the issues that I
taught in my PHIL 100 course as well as in an article that I wrote,
solicited by the editor of Xavier’s Alumni magazine, defending
doctor-assisted suicide—had diminished the philosophical
respect of my colleagues since applied philosophy was
considered by them to be “a regrettable devaluation of the
discipline.” I also included a supportive letter from an ad hoc
committee of Xavier’s AAUP chapter, which I had asked to
investigate my tenure decision. The ad hoc committee alleged
“that there may have been a bias, a bias rooted in sectarian
philosophical differences, that played an important role in
the department’s negative evaluation” of my teaching. The
committee recognized “the seriousness and potentially divisive
nature” of its own conclusion, and stated that it believed my
case could have “a chilling effect on academic freedom at
Xavier.” Finally, there was another supportive letter from a highly
respected senior member of the faculty who expressed concern
that the previous two members of the philosophy department
whom I succeeded and who presented “differing views were
not granted tenure.” He believed that a third denial would look
to be more than mere coincidence.
As part of my written appeal, I urged the Tenure and
Promotion Committee to seek impartial testimony from
philosophers outside of Xavier to judge whether the material
that I taught had “relation to the subject” as well as whether
my methods, in particular my attempts to apply the ideas in
the readings to current events and to use newspaper articles,
were pedagogically legitimate. I believed that if I could establish

my interpretation of the course requirements as legitimate or
reasonable, then the department’s refusal to grant me tenure
would constitute a violation of my academic freedom since
I had taught within the framework of the course. In the end,
however, the Tenure and Promotion Committee denied my
request for external review, and it voted against my appeal
without any comment.
My final recourse on campus was to appeal the violation
of my academic freedom to a campus Grievance Committee.
This time, I presented my case in writing and in person, and the
philosophy department did likewise. The department defended
its position by citing the Supreme Court case Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, which affirmed that academic freedom implies the
right to teach theories that are in conflict with conventional or
“orthodox” views. The department claimed that since it had
not required me to present and defend the teaching of Jesuit or
other Catholic authors or teach and defend Aristotle or Aquinas,
it did not violate my academic freedom. The department
argued further that it ultimately had the right to decide what is
appropriate in its PHIL 100 course:
Clearly, the department must be the judge of what
is appropriate in a required core course, such as the
ethics course, and if a teacher persists in teaching
something else, e.g., political science or civics, he is
quite properly blamed by the department. Matz taught
and defended J.S. Mill’s liberalism, as opposed to the
views of other philosophers. The department never
raised any objection to his opinions about what was
true or correct. It stated, however, that if Matz wanted
to teach Mill’s thought in an ethics course, he should
discuss Mill’s basic ethical treatise, Utilitarianism, and
not Mill’s political works. The department was dealing,
not with Matz’s opinions, orthodox or unorthodox, but
with the kinds of problems that ought to be addressed
in an ethics course. Clearly this is a matter which
the department may and should determine for its
members.
Of course, the department did have the right to design PHIL
100 in whatever way it wanted and to have faculty conform
to these expectations; however, the only explicit expectations
stated for the course were to teach Plato’s Republic and teach
primary source material that dealt with the subject matter of
the course. The department never identified preferred works
to teach, never distinguished between ethical and “political”
works, and never explicitly discouraged the teaching of applied
ethical issues. So, although it is true that the department never
required me to teach only Jesuit or Catholic writers or to teach
only Aristotle or Aquinas, it violated my academic freedom in
forbidding me from teaching applied ethical problems, such as
the rightful limits of social and political power, the moral and
legal treatment of women, and the moral status of animals.
The department’s interpretation of the appropriate issues or
problems of the course was not the sole legitimate one, and
since my interpretation was reasonable—indeed, I thought
it was mainstream—the department violated my academic
freedom in its negative tenure evaluation. I maintain that the
department had no authority to settle principled differences
of opinion regarding pedagogy since academic freedom
is supposed to protect principled differences of opinion.
Additionally, the department’s claim that I persisted in defying
the official guidelines of the course or departmental advice
was simply mistaken. The only time anyone suggested to me
that Utilitarianism should be taught instead of On Liberty was
after the senior member of the department (the one who wrote
the departmental evaluation) visited my course in spring 1997,
the semester before I applied for tenure. The department had
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plenty of opportunity to register a complaint about my course
before then, but it never did so. I turned in a syllabus to the chair
every semester beginning in the fall of 1992. Moreover, a year
or two before I applied for tenure, those who taught PHIL 100
reevaluated the focus of the course by exchanging syllabi and
discussing our respective approaches.
The Grievance Committee upheld the department’s
position. It concluded that regardless of my arguments about
the philosophical legitimacy of the issues that I taught in my
PHIL 100 course, the department ultimately had the authority
to judge. Nonetheless, in the concluding section of its report,
the Grievance Committee acknowledged the troublesome
implications for academic freedom in the philosophy
department. It raised two questions that appeared to support
my grievance. It asked, “Does the Philosophy department hold a
‘rigid,’ and perhaps undesirable, adherence to a homogeneous
approach to teaching?” and “Is there a need for more open and
collegial intellectual debate regarding teaching and scholarship
within this department?” It concluded by urging university
officials “to engage the Philosophy Department in a dialogue
to explore the possibility of fostering greater academic diversity
in teaching.”
The Grievance Committee also learned that some
philosophy faculty felt administrative pressure to hire me
although I did not fit the “profile” of someone that it would
normally hire since my philosophical and pedagogical approach
was contrary to the “prevailing departmental culture,” as
“applied techniques in the classroom were and remain contrary
to the department’s ‘norm’ of teaching.” I was never aware
of these circumstances of my hire until I read the Grievance
Committee’s report.
The defeat of my grievance exhausted all internal
processes at Xavier. My final recourse was to bring my case to
The American Philosophical Association’s Committee for the
Defense of the Professional Rights of Philosophers. I believed
that, at long last, I might get the independent, external review of
my department’s judgments that had been wanting throughout
the entire grievance process. The allegation that my department
had violated my academic freedom in its evaluation of my PHIL
100 course was one of seven allegations that I brought, but I
believed it was the strongest. After reviewing these allegations,
the APA Committee decided to investigate three allegations that
were “especially troubling”; however, to my dismay, the APA
dropped my allegation about the PHIL 100 course. Since I do
not know how the department responded to the APA, I can only
speculate on the reasons the APA did not investigate.
*****
In its “Statement on Procedural Standards in the Renewal or
Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments,” the AAUP identifies
a standard to judge whether there has been a violation of
academic freedom: Did the department give the faculty member
“adequate consideration”? It defines this standard in procedural
and not substantive terms:
Was the decision conscientiously arrived at? Was
all available evidence bearing on the relevant
performance of the candidate sought out and
considered? Was there adequate deliberation by the
department over the import of the evidence in light of
the relevant standards?...Was the decision a bona fide
exercise of professional academic judgment? These
are the kinds of questions suggested by the standard
of “adequate consideration.3
Without making explicit reference to it, Xavier’s philosophy
department and Xavier’s Grievance Committee appeared to rely

on such a standard to judge my case. That is, the issue for them
was the conscientiousness of the process and not the validity or
wisdom of the conclusion. While I do not know the grounds of
the APA’s assessment of my allegation about PHIL 100, I contend
that a purely procedural standard is inadequate. For this allows
that even after extensive deliberation, a department of narrow
ideologues or a department with a few dominant and influential
ideologues who can stifle the dissent of others can still violate
a faculty member’s academic freedom. Whether a department
has given “adequate consideration” to a faculty member
thus cannot simply be a matter of rendering “conscientious
judgment”; the competence or substance of that judgment, and
not merely its process, should also be a condition to protect the
academic freedom of faculty against colleagues.
I recommend that the APA add a section on “Academic
Freedom,” perhaps after the section “Evaluation,” in its
“Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy.”
The addition should call attention to the importance of academic
freedom, identify what the APA takes to be the principles and
standard of academic freedom, and describe the relationship
between a department’s exercise of professional judgment
and a faculty member’s right of academic freedom. Such a
statement might be useful in motivating departments to be
more specific in their course descriptions and expectations for
faculty and in helping to minimize disputes within a department.
I believe that unlike the AAUP’s purely procedural standard,
the APA should support some substantive elements in its
standard of academic freedom and judge on them. Among
some of the questions relevant for this expanded standard of
academic freedom could be: Are the readings and issues in fact
relevant for the course given the course description? Are certain
teaching methods in fact legitimate and reasonable? Were the
APA to fashion an explicit statement in “Statements on the
Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy,” it would strengthen its
stance that departments should strive to develop “educational
experiences of high quality.” After all, institutional judgments
about the quality of teaching and educational experiences may
sometimes be nothing but reflections of ideology.4
Endnotes
1. “Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy,”
p. 1.
2. The reader might wonder why the department claimed
that issues such as the rightful limits of social and political
control over individual liberty, the moral status of animals,
the morality of civil disobedience, and moral and legal
standing of women were not relevant for a course devoted
to justice and ethical issues of social significance. The most
influential members of the department hold a “Great Books”
view of philosophy: real philosophy takes place only in
conversations about the great texts, not in an application of
their ideas outside of them. Moreover, the power structure of
the department held a rigid Straussian view that the ancient
ethical thinkers (Plato, Aristotle) are superior to the modern
ones (Mill, Rawls) since, in this view, virtue, not liberty, is
the proper focus of ethics and hence anyone sympathetic to
political liberalism and moral liberal views is not a serious or
real philosopher and teacher. For an account that captures
the sensibility of the power structure in Xavier’s department,
see Richard Rorty, “That Old-Time Philosophy,” The New
Republic, April 4, 1988.
3. “Statement on Procedural Standards in the Renewal
or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments,” AAUP Policy
Documents and Reports, Tenth Edition, p. 20.
4. Thanks to Michelle DiGuilio, Richard Arneson, Ed Lee, Bob
Gillis, John Sims, Cynthia Dobbs, and the reviewers at the
APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy for their comments
on earlier drafts. I’d also like to thank those at Xavier who
supported me through my experience, especially John
Fairfield, Paul Knitter, Stafford Johnson, and Bill Jones.
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